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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\"X'ILLIAM f. SMITH and PATSY 
SMITH, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
CARROLL REALTY COMPANY, a 
Corporation, and 
NATHANIEL A. SMITH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8892 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Appeal is from a Special Verdict of a Jury in the 
Third District Court, awarding to plaintiffs damages in the 
sum of $4,850.00 in connection with an exchange of property 
of the plaintiffs in Salt Lake City, Utah, for property in Lava 
Hot Springs and assumption of mortgage on the Salt Lake 
City property. Defendants were real estate broker and salesman 
for the plaintiffs. 
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The Complaint alleges that plaintiffs are husband and 
wife and that defendant, Nathaniel A. Smith, was a licensed 
real estate salesman connected with the Carroll Realty Co., 
a real estate broker, at the time of the listing of the Salt Lake 
City property of plaintiffs with defendants; defendants, as 
agents of plaintiffs, negotiated an exchange of property with 
Mr. and Mrs. Nick Kladis of Lava Hot Springs, Idaho, the 
properties being valued at $23,500.00 for the Salt Lake City 
property and $15,500.00 for the Lava Hot Springs property; 
that plaintiffs directed the defendants to consult with qualified 
persons in Lava Hot Springs, as to the value of the Kladis 
property and that defendants falsely and fraudulently mis-
represented the information received as to value and that 
plaintiffs entered into the exchange relying on the false infor-
mation and suffered damage in the sum of $8,000.00 (R. 1, 2). 
An Amended Complaint added a Second Cause of Action, 
alleging that defendants "negligently failed to exercise due 
care in accordance with the standards of their profession to 
determine the value of the said Kladis property" and alleged 
damage as a result of such negligence at $8,000.00 (R. 9). 
After the trial of the case, the plaintiffs waived their 
claim on the basis of fraud and deleted the First Cause of 
Action and added as an additional Count "the right to receive, 
as damages, the commission paid in this case" (R. 272). 
Defendants denied receipt of the commission made the 
subject matter of the Third Cause of Action (R. 273) and 
by Amended Answers took issue with the Second Cause of 
Action (R. 15, 16, 17, 18). The First Defense denied the 
alleged negligence (R. 15); the Second Defense pleaded 
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estoppel of plaintiffs to plead neligence or reliance on the 
defendants because the plaintiffs inspected the Kladis property 
and in signing the exchange agreement waived any cause for 
negligence against the defendants in making or failing to make 
determinations of value (R. 15) ; the Third Defense pleaded 
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs as a bar to their 
action, well knowing the extent of the inspection and inquiry 
made by the defendants of the Lava Hot Springs property 
(R. 16); the Fourth Defense alleged that plaintiffs "assumed 
the risk of disproportion in making the exchange of properties, 
well knowing that no appraisal of etiher the Idaho or the Utah 
properties was made" (R. 17); the Fifth Defense challenged 
the alleged oral modification requiring defendants to determine 
the value of the Kladis property as being void under the 
Statute of Frauds (R. 18); and the Sixth Defense alleged 
acceptance, approval, and ratification of the acts of defendants 
by entering into the written exchange agreement and closing 
the transaction on or about February 1, 1951 (R. 18). 
At the first pretrial of the case the only issue presented 
was whether a preponderance of evidence would be sufficient 
to go to the jury (on the First Cause of Action) and to con-
tinue the pretrial (R. 7). At the second pretrial the plaintiff, 
William F. Smith, admitted that his Salt Lake property was 
listed with the Carroll Realty Company for sale or exchange 
(R. 8) and there were no other pretrials which modified the 
issues raised by the pleadings. 
Following the trial of the case, defendants filed a Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict or for a New Trial 
(R. 61-64) and then a Supplement to Motion for New Trial 
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on the basis of newly discovered evidence, to which certain 
documents were attached (R. 68-73) and which will be dis. 
cussed more fully as part of the Statement of Facts. 
The Court, in writing, made its Partial Decision on said 
Motions (R. 74-77), holding open the question of new trial 
for newly discovered evidence (R. 76) and, finally, denied the 
said Motion For a New Trial (R. 79). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William F. Smith, one of the plaintiffs, testified that he 
bought the home at 3031 South 8th East, Salt Lake City, in 
June of 1950 and listed the home for sale with Nathaniel A. 
Smith at the price of $23,000.00, having previously been ac-
quainted with Nathaniel Smith (R. 99). It is a rambler-type, 
hip roof home on a large lot (R. 100). "It was advertised 
regularly. There was a pretty fair attempt made to sell it. 
* * * There may have been some discussion on something 
other than less than 'the listed price,' but 'no offer was enter-
tained ' " (R. 101). 
In the autumn of 1950, shown a photograph of the Lava 
Hot Springs property, "I said I certainly would not be inter-
ested in ever making a deal without seeing more than a photo-
graph" and so William F. Smith and Nathaniel Smith went 
to Lava Hot Springs around the 9th of December, 1950 (R. 
102) . Theye were at the Kladis home in Lava Hot Springs 
for two or three hours and "Mr. Kladis directed us through the 
place'' and some interest in making a transaction was exhibited 
(R. 103). 
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On the return trip from Lava Hot Springs, the two Smiths 
had "quite a discussion about it" and "at the time I felt that 
I did not want to make the deal." He was interested in the 
posibility of moving the property rapidly and Mr. Smith 
thought it would be an easy task (R. 104). He felt that 
$18,000.00 was too high for the Kladis property and "that we 
could probably get $15,000.00 out of it" (R. 105). 
Coming back, plaintiff said he wanted to find out more 
about the property and that he needed money to pay the com-
mission on this transaction as well as on an earlier transaction 
that Nathaniel Smith had handled. Nate Smith thought he 
could get Kladis to provide some cash on a mortgage and 
$5,000.00 was discussed (R. 106, 107). Thereafter he kept 
in touch with Mr. Smith periodically and about January 25, 
1951 "we met at the Fletcher-Lucas office, first in a group 
and then I had a discussion with Mr. Smith, privately. * * * 
I asked him what he had found out * * * about the property 
in Idaho. He said: 'Yes, from all I can determine, it looks 
like a good deal to me' " (R. 108). "He said he had con-
tacted a reliable source (R. 108). I had previously asked 
him to find out from some reliable people in Lava Hot Springs 
what the value of the property was and he had said he would 
(R. 109). At the time of the trade the Eighth East home 
had a mortgage of $7,500.00 on it and Mr. Kladis advanced 
money on the Lava Hot Springs property to enable him to 
pay the commission (R. 110). Kladis had moved into the 
Salt Lake City property after renting the Lava Hot Springs 
property from him for February, 1951 for $75.00, and then 
it was vacant until April 20th while efforts were made to sell 
the property (R. 111). Carroll Realty Office gave some assist-
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ance in renting the property and it was listed for sale with 
the Pocatello Realty (R. 1.12), but he was unable to sell the 
property ( R. 113) . The property was lost through foreclosure 
of the Kladis mortgage for $3,000.00, the foreclosure being 
for some $4,400.00 (R. 114). 
After the noon recess, plaintiff Smith was asked again 
about the conversations between the Smiths on the return from 
Lava Hot Springs and plaintiff testified: "I said, 'Nate, I am 
very much concerned about this transaction, and I don't know 
anything about property values in Lava, so I want to rely upon 
you to do that for me' "; that is, to make some investigations 
concerning the property and "he said, 'Bill, I feel that I will 
help you just as much as I can on this case, and I will do that 
for you.' " (R. 115); and there was a further conversation 
about this in the Fletcher-Lucas Office when Nate Smith said 
he had made investigations and "it looked to me like it would 
be a reasonable price to allow for that property at Lava," 
and plaintiff told him: "Nate, you know I rely on you-on 
your judgment-and, if you say it is O.K., it is O.K. by me." 
And in entering into the transaction he relied on defendant 
Smith's statement about these investigations (R. 116). In the 
latter part of February, 1954, the plaintiff made an investigation 
at Lava Hot Springs to determine what had happened and 
called on a banker, the manager of a Lumber Company, and 
a Mr. Teeples, who operates a cleaning establishment and 
was the L.D.S. Bishop (R. 117). Plaintiffs completed the 
commission payments to the defendant Smith for the exchange 
transaction and also the commission previously owed. 
The exchange agreement was made Exhibit 1, and con-
summated by warranty deeds and mortgage, marked Exhibit 2. 
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Exhibit 1 is as follows: 
"EXCHANGE AGREEMENT" 
"The Exchange Agreement Witnesseth: That the 
undersigned, Nick Kladis, of the County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho, hereinafter called the first party, hereby 
offers to exchange the following described property, 
situated in Lava Hot Springs, County of Bannock, State 
of Idaho, to-wit: 
180 x 110 feet of ground, together with all improve-
ments thereon, located on Brooks Street, valued at 
$15,500.00, free and clear of all encumbrance, 
for property owned by W. F. Smith, of the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereinafter called the second 
party, situated in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
3031 South 8th East, consisting of 100 x 284 feet, 
together with 1 share of Mill Creek Irrigation water, 
valued at $23,000.00, subject to a mortgage of 
$7,500.00 which the buyer of 3031 South 8th East 
agrees to assume and pay. 
Terms and Conditions of Exchange 
Each party hereto shall supply an Abstract of title 
for their respective properties described herein, within 
30 days from the date this offer is accepted by the 
second party, made by a bonded abstractor showing 
the titles to said properties to be merchantable and 
free from all taxes, assessments, liens or encumbrances, 
except as herein mentioned and the hereinafter named 
agent is authorized to procure and deliver said abstracts 
of title. Each party shall pay for the abstracting of 
title to the property to be conveyed by him and the 
legal opinion rendered thereon. 
Each party hereto shall execute and deliver, within 
30 days from the date this offer is accepted, all instru-
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ments necessary to transfer the titles to said properties 
and complete and consummate this exchange. 
In the event errors appear in the titles to either or 
any of said properties, then this agreement shall be 
extended for a reasonable time and that the same may 
be corrected. In the event any error cannot be corrected, 
this agreement shall be null and void, except as to the 
payment of commissions, unless the title to the property 
affected is accepted subject thereto. 
All taxes, insurance, rents and other expenses affect· 
ing said properties shall be pro-rated from the date 
this exchange is completed and consummated. Any 
act required to be done may be extended not longer 
than thirty days by the hereinafter named agent. 
Fletcher-Lucas Investment Co., of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, is hereby authorized to act as agent for all parties 
hereto and may accept commission therefrom, and 
should this offer be accepted by the second party, the 
undersigned first party agrees to pay said agent the usual 
and regular $775.00 commission for services rendered 
to become due on the execution of this agreement by 
all parties hereto. 
It is also presumed and understood that all principals 
to this agreement have investigated the respective 
properties, and the agent or broker is hereby released 
from all responsibility regarding valuation of same. 
I have read (or have had read to me) this entire 
agreement and understand the terms and conditions 
contained therein. 
Dated December 18, 1950. 
s/ Nick Kladis 
Witness: 
s/ H. E. Baird 
10 
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Acceptance 
I accept the foregoing offer upon the terms and 
conditions stated, and the undersigned, hereinbefore 
called the second party agrees to pay Fletcher-Lucas 
Inv. Co., agent, of Salt Lake City, Utah, Eleven Hun-
dred Fifty Dollars, ($1,150.00) commission for serv-
ices rendered to become due on the execution of this 
agreement by all parties hereto. 
I have read (or have had read to me) this entire 
agreement and understand the terms and conditions 
contained therein. * * * * * * * * to include stoves 
and heating equipment, subject to getting a $3,000.00 
loan on Lava Hot Springs place. 
Dated January 5, 1951 
s/ W. F. Smith 
Witness: 
s/ N. A. Smith." 
Exhibit 2 consisted of a warranty deed from Nick Kladis 
and Y erda Kladis of Lava Hot Springs, to the plaintiffs, 
dated February 1, 1951 and conveying the Lava Hot Springs 
property. It also includes the warranty deed from the plaintiffs 
to Nick and Y erda Kladis, covering the Salt Lake City prop-
erty, subject to a mortgage for the balance of $7,500.00. It 
also included a mortgage for $3,000.00 on the Lava Hot Springs 
property to Nick and Y erda Kladis. 
On cross-examination, the plaintiff Smith testified that he 
was a life insurance agent and was 39 years old (R. 119) and 
acquired the Eighth East home on a trade in a family trans-
action, his father having an interest in the Eighth East home 
(R. 120). The Eighth East home was acquired on a trade for 
,;_ grocery store valued at $14,500.00, the Eighth East home 
] 1 
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was valued at $22,000.00 and a mortgage of $7,500.00 on 
it was assumed. No appraisal was made of either of those prop-
erties in the exchange, which was handled by Nathaniel A. 
Smith and Carroll Realty (R. 122). Before making the trade, 
he inspected the Eighth East property once and viewed it 
twice from the outside and spent "not very long" in looking 
it over. Title was taken in the names of him and his wife 
(R. 123). In August, 1950, he borrowed $7,650.00 on the 
home to refinance it, which refinancing produced no cash 
but put the mortgage in his name and his wife's instead of 
Mecham's, who had previously owned it (R. 125). The note 
was payable on February, 1951 in the full amount of $7,650.00, 
and by moving into the Eighth East home he could have 
obtained some long term financing (R. 126). At that time 
he was living in a home at 5755 Hanson Circle, which had 
been purchased for $8,750.00 with a balance owing of $7,500.00 
(R. 127}. 
Exhibit 3 was a copy of the listing agreement on the 
Eighth East home showing a mortgage balance of $6,765.00 
on June 30th, which the plaintiff then recalled as the correct 
balance, which was increased in August, 1950, to $7,650.00 
upon application for a loan for a larger amount (R. 129). The 
amount on the listing agreement, Exhibit 3, is $23,000.00 
asking price, which amount was suggested by the defendant 
Smith (R. 130). 
The Eighth East home was surrounded mostly by vacant 
property, with a mink ranch across the street, although it is 
now built up into new homes. There were some people shown 
through the property, but no offers to buy (R. LH, 132). 
!2 
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Exhibit 4, dated December 11, 1950 was received after 
the trip to Lava Hot Springs, which was made on a Friday, 
the 8th day of December (R. 133). 
Exhibit 4 is on the same form as Exhibit 1 and offers to 
trade the Lava Hot Springs property by Nick Kladis for 
$18,000.00 on the Eighth East property at $23,000.00 and 
assume a balance of $5,000.00, signed by Nick Kladis only, 
with no acceptance. Exhibit 4 was not satisfactory because the 
mortgage to be assumed was $5,000.00 and it actually was 
$7,150.00 on the Eighth East home. He first saw Exhibit 1, 
dated December 18, 1950 "when I signed it, which was Janu-
ary 5." It involves a difference in the mortgage assumed of 
$7,500.00 and also a $3,000.00 loan on the Lava Hot Springs 
property. The terms on Exhibit 1 were satisfactory, provided 
the investigation of the Lava Hot Springs property was satis-
factory (R. 135, 136). Defendant Smith tried to get Kladis to 
loan $5,000.00 instead of $3,000.00 and signed it at $3,000.00 
because the $5,000.00 could not be obtained. It was January 
5, 1951 when the plaintiff Smith told defendant Smith he was 
relying upon his investigation of the Lava Hot Springs prop-
erty in making the agreement (R. 138). The plaintiff asked: 
"Nate, did you ask-did you inquire of anyone in Lava as 
I requested-namely,t he L.D.S. Bishop, as one? He said: 
'Yes, I have, and, from what I could learn from him, he said 
he felt that might be a fair price on that property, " and plain-
tiff said: "Nate, I rely entirely on you" (R. 139). From 
January 5th to February 1st the transaction just waited for 
dosing, there being some bad weather (R. 139). 
On January 5th, when we met at the Fletcher-Lucas 
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Office, plaintiff was told he was free to back out of the trans-
action, but this was not said after January 5th, after he signed 
the agreement (R. 140). 
William F. Smith handled the transaction. His wife did not 
confer with any of the people (R. 141). 
On the trip to Lava Hot Springs, plaintiff Smith had 
looked through the inside and the outside of the Lava property 
and he found it "in very probable condition at that time" 
(R. 142) . He discussed with defendant Smith the possibility 
of using it for a hotel or motel. Defendant Smith told the 
plaintiff he was not familiar with properties in Lava Hot 
Springs (R. 143) . 
Plaintiff went to Lava Hot Springs with Mr. Carroll in 
June, 1951 and in August, 1951. 
"Q. Do you remember whether, on the day you went 
to Lava Hot Springs with Mr. Smith, before you 
parted, after you had returned to Salt Lake, you 
signed an offer-a counter proposal of some kind? 
A. No, I don't remember that. 
Q. Do you recall whether there were any counter 
offers made, other than the two I had shown you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you originate any? 
A. No. 
Q. These two were both originated by Mr. Kladis, 
weren't they? 
A. Yes. 
14 
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Q. You don't think you made any counter proposal 
to Mr. Kladis? You don't recall any? 
A. No." (R. 148). 
While in Lava Hot Springs, Mr. and Mrs. Kladis had 
represented the Lava property very highly and placed the 
value of $18,000.00 on it (R. 150). They compared it with 
one or two other homes there which had recently been sold 
and mentioned the prices (R. 150). Plaintiff did not tell them 
he did not think their house was worth $18,000.00 (R. 151). 
In the foreclosure action brought by the Kladis estate following 
the death of Mr. Kladis, plaintiff filed a counter-claim, alleg-
ing that Mr. and Mrs. Kladis had defrauded him and that 
they had represented that they had the opinion of a banker 
and the L.D.S. Bishop as to values (R. 151, 154). 
Fred F. Jensen testified for the plaintiff that he was a 
retired real estate broker, having retired in March, 1954 (R. 
162). There is a common practice or procedure upon which 
a realtor determines market value of property which includes 
consideration of the community, the building, depreciation, 
the neighborhood, comparable transactions (R. 162-163). His 
opinoin is that inquiring of a stranger by long distance tele-
phone, the stranger being in the cleaning and dyeing business 
is not the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence in deter-
mining market value, where the buyer has himself inspected the 
property and the transaction being considered is an exchange 
(R. 163-164). 
On cross-examination Mr. Jensen testified that he had 
been a member of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board only prior 
to 1940 (R. 166) and that the procedure he described on 
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direct examination was for making an appraisal of property. 
He had been an appraiser for Home Owners Loan Corporation 
and followed this procedure (R. 167). When properties are 
being exchanged, it is frequent that both properties are in-
ated and if the person making the exchange wants the value 
determined, it should be done in the manner he testified (R. 
169) . Sometimes exchanges are left without determination 
of values knowing that both properties are inflated and both 
parties feel they have made a good bargain (R. 170). Witness 
has known William F. Smith ever since he was a kid and 
knows his parents (R. 170) . On redirect Mr. Jensen testi-
fied that he had not appraised the Eighth East home, but 
that the builder told him it cost $15,000.00 (R. 172). 
Robert C. Banning testified for the plaintiffs that he is 
a real estate broker from Twin Falls, Idaho (R. 89). He 
visited the property of William F. Smith in Lava Hot Springs 
some time in 1951 and made an inspection for the purpose 
of determining market value (R. 91) and that the market 
value would be between $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 (R. 91). 
\Villiam F. Smith listed the property for sale, but he was not 
able to sell it (R. 95). The property was listed by William F. 
Smith at $16,000.00 (R. 96). 
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS 
1'\1rs. Yerda N. Kladis testified that she is the widow of 
Mr. Kladis, who died February 28, 1951. She resides at 3031 
South 8th East, having moved there from Lava Hot Springs 
on or about the 15th of }.1arch, 1951. As administratrix of 
his estate she foreclosed the mortgage of the Lava Hot Springs 
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property against Mr. and Mrs. Smith. The condition of the 
Lava Hot Springs property was good when it was traded to 
the Smiths, with recent paint inside and out, grass and shrub-
bery. The Eighth East house was in not too good condition when 
she moved into that. There were holes in the walls, it needed 
painting, it needed to have the floors revarnished, the roof 
graphite and oiled and the plumbing cleaned out (R. 181 to 
183). She put a fence around the property, had awnings put 
on and planted some more lawn, painting inside and outside 
(R. 184). 
She recalls a visit of Mr. Nate Smith and Mr. William 
Smith to Lava Hot Springs, believes it was in January, 1951 
(R. 184). At that time her husband had not seen the Eighth 
East property. She saw it before the trade was made, but after 
the Smiths had come to Lava (R. 185). 
On cross-examination Mrs. Kladis testified that the Lava 
Hot Springs property is still in the estate and is not being 
rented. It was rented for about six months at $45.00 a month 
(R. 187). 
Hyrum E. Baird testified that he has been a real estate 
salesman for 30 to 35 years and was employed by Fletcher-
Lucas Investment Company. He has been with them nearly 
thirty years (R. 188). He obtained a listing on the Kladis 
property in Lava Hot Springs, which is Exhibit 5, dated De-
cember 11, 1950 and had known Mr. Kladis for a little while 
before that. He had been looking for a place for Mr. Kladis 
in Salt Lake City and took Mr. Kladis to look at the Eighth 
East property (R. 189). Exhibit 4 was also signed on December 
11th and it was either on that date or a few days before that 
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he and Mr. Kladis had looked at the Eighth East property. 
They had discussed listing his Lava Hot Springs property 
before that time but had never listed it until the matter of 
the Eighth East possible trade came up (R. 190) . 
He does not know where the original of Exhibit 4 is. 
There were other offers made involving the exchange. Mr. 
Smith made a counter offer and came into the office to make 
a change from the $5,000.00 he was asking to $3,000.00 (R. 
190). As he recalls it, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Kladis came 
into his office to make the correction on the exchange agree-
ment, as Mr. Kladis would not loan $5,000.00 on the property 
and make the deal and that is when they changed to $3,000.00 
(R. 191). At the time of closing Mr. Kladis had Mr. Diamant, 
an attorney, present to represent him. Everyone seemed happy 
at that time. 
There is no rule in the real estate profession in Salt Lake 
City that it is the agent's duty to determine correct values in 
an exchange. Getting an appraisal is a matter for the parties 
(R. 192). 
On cross-examination Mr. Baird testified that he repre-
sented the Kladises in the transaction (R. 192). 
Nathaniel A. Smith testified that he lives in Salt Lake City 
and has been in the real estate business for t\YelYe years, first 
as salesman and then as broker, and was licensed with Mr. 
Wayne Carroll for a little over a year in 1950 and 1951 
(R. 193). 
No values were discussed by him and William Smith in 
connection with the exchange of 3031 South Eighth East for the 
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grocery store (R. 194). William Smith listed the property 
with Carroll Realty and Mr. Carroll gave him credit for the 
listing, as he had known Mr. Smith. He had no conversation 
with Mr. Smith before the listing was taken (R. 195). 
The property was shown but no offers were received until 
the Kladis exchange came in. Mr. Smith came into the office 
quite frequently and they discussed the price and the reasons 
the property had not sold (R. 197-198). 
The first offer from Mr. Kladis was Exhibit 4 on the 
basis of $18,000.00 on the Kladis property and $23,000.00 
on the Smith property, which was the premise Smith went to 
Lava on (R. 198). They went in all of the rooms and inspected 
the house generally, inside and outside, including the garages 
and both were favorably impressed with the property. While 
there, there was no conversation about values (R. 199). They 
drove around the town and he advised Mr. Smith he was not 
familiar with the Lava property and went to the Mineral 
Springs, two or three short blocks away (R. 200). 
On the return trip there was a lot of conversation about 
the two properties and the exchange (R. 212). 
I said to Mr. Smith: "Now, Mr. Kladis has made an 
offer here, he has offered his place for $18,000.00. We cannot 
take that. You do not have $18,000.00 equity in your place, 
supposing it is being turned in on this deal at $23,000.00, but 
assuming that he wll allow you $23,000.00 for your place 
on Eighth East, you would have over and above the mortgage 
approximately $15,500.00. Now, would you be willing to 
accept his place in Lava and $15,500.00 and let him assume 
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your mortgage on that Eighth East property" He said he 
would, but he needed a little cash to pay off some obligations 
and had promised his dad some money if he sold the Eighth 
East place. He asked if I thought he could get a mortgage 
on the Lava place of $5,000.00 and I suggested that Mr. 
Kladis might give him a mortgage for that amount and let 
him pay it back by renting the place or developing it if he 
wanted to (R. 214). Smith said: "By golly, if I could do that, 
if I could borrow some money on that Lava place that would 
be a good deal and if we could turn that in and take it at 
$15,500.00 on Eighth East, for $23,000.00, that would be 
a good deal for me" (R. 214-215). Nate Smith said that 
seemed like a good deal and he should take his wife and go 
look the place over. Three or four times on the way down 
he said he believed he would take that, if they could make 
that deal. And so, upon return to Salt Lake, they went right 
to Carroll's office and wrote up a counter offer at $15,500.00 
instead of $18,000.00 and the counter proposal was signed, 
but he doesn't have a copy of it, it was delivered to Fletcher-
Lucas' office to present back to Mr. Kladis. Mr. Kladis would 
not loan the $5,000.00 but came back with another proposal 
at $3,000.00. Smith's counter-proposal was at $23,000.00 for 
Eighth East, $15,500. for Lava, and Kladis to loan Smith 
$5,000.00 on a first mortgage, which was signed on the same 
form as Exhibit 4 and delivered to Fletcher-Lucas. Exhibit 1 
looks like the one Kladis submitted back after the counter-
proposal (R. 216). It might have been two or three days or 
a week between Smith's counter-proposal and the new pro-
posal signed by Kladis. It was signed by William Smith 
January 5th in the Carroll Realty Office. The agreement v.ras 
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read over carefully and Smith knew exactly what was in it. 
The $5,000.00 offer was never returned and the one that came 
back had $3,000.00 (R. 218). Between the time Exhibit 1 
was offered on January 5th, he talked to Mr. Smith and told 
him Kladis did not want to stall around and if Mr. Smith 
did not want the deal, he was going to look for another place 
as he wanted to get his family down here. During that period 
of time he talked to Mr. Kladis as to whether Exhibit 1 was to 
remain open and subject to acceptance by William Smith. One 
conversation took place in the Fletcher-Lucas office at which 
he and Mr. Smith, Mr. Baird and Mr. Kladis were present. Mr. 
Kladis wanted to know whether the deal was going to be 
accepted or not, if it was not, he wanted to be relieved of 
it and go ahead and purchase another property. Smith asked 
if Nick Kladis would raise the loan and Nick said: "No, that 
is the best I will do." So Smith said: "Alright, I will take 
tt" and it was signed. The two Smiths' went over to Carroll's 
office to talk it over and sign it, and it was then that they 
went over the contents of the terms and conditions of the 
exchange "and I told Mr. Smith that this was a decision that 
he would have to make. He had seen the property, and he 
knew what the exchange called for, and considering all things, 
it looked like a fair exchange" (R. 223-224). This was when 
they read the contract together and they also read the contract 
together the first time he signed one on the evening after they 
returned from Idaho (R. 224). The agreement was read to 
Smith, a paragraph at a time. He read this paragraph: "It 
is also presumed and understood that all principals to this 
agreement have investigated the respective properties, and 
the agent or broker is hereby released from all responsibility 
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regarding valuation of the same." And I said: "Now, you 
understand that you have inspected the property, and Mr. 
Kladis has inspected your property, and you are buying this 
property on your own judgment?' And he answered: "I under-
stand that" (R. 229). And they read together the acceptance 
which recites: "I accept the foregoing offer upon the terms 
and conditions stated, and the undersigned, hereinbefore called 
the second party * * * . I have read, or have had read to me, 
this entire agreemnt and understand the terms and conditions 
contained therein." And he said he understood it and there-
upon signed it and I witnessed it (R. 230-231). Nothing 
was said at that time about information received from Mr. 
Teeples. The conversation about that was the second or third 
day after the trip to Lava. The day after the trip he called 
Mr. Teeples, the L.D.S. Bishop, and got his report and reported 
that to Mr. Smith one evening when he dropped in the office 
(R. 231). 
On their way back from Lava Hot Springs it was mutually 
agreed that he should call the Bishop and see what he thought 
about values (R. 231-232). After calling Mr. Teeples he 
reported to Mr. Smith "that Mr. Teeples said he was not a 
real estate man, but he was familiar with property in Lava, 
he was in business there, and he thought that that property 
was a little high at $15,500.00, but that on a trade for Salt 
Lake property that would be another thing, as it might be a 
fair exchange" (R. 23). Mr. Carroll was present at that con-
versation and it was never discussed again. He was still holding 
out to see if he could get the $5,000.00 mortgage (R. 232). 
At the closing of the transaction on or about February 1st, 
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both parties expressed satisfaction with the deal, the documents 
were explained, and the transaction was closed (R. 233-234). 
He is of the opinion the store in Murray traded by Smith 
and others for the Eighth East property was worth about 
$6,000.00 (R. 234-235). 
While the Eighth East property had been listed, he talked 
to Mr. Smith about the price and told him: "If we get the 
price down where it ought to sell, it will sell," and he sug-
gested that we advertise it for a trade. So Mr. Carroll advertised 
the property for trade and it was at that time that Baird from 
Fletcher-Lucas called (R. 235-236). 
On cross-examination Mr. Nathaniel A. Smith testified: 
The Fletcher-Lucas Office got the commission of 5% 
of $23,000.00 on the Eighth East house, which he approved 
(R. 238), having received a portion of the listing commission 
(R. 238). 
As they returned from Lava Hot Springs they discussed 
Smith's equity in the home of $15,500.00 and they wrote 
up an offer which they don't have, since it was never returned 
after Smith's counter-offer had been submitted. "He finally 
said it was a good deal and he wanted to take it" (R. 239). 
The next day, he called Mr. Teeples. This was after he had 
signed the counter-offer (R. 239). After the call to Teeples 
was reported to Mr. Smith, he said: "I have got a cushion in 
that Eighth East place. I can come out on it alright" (R. 241). 
C. Francis Solomon testified for the defendant that he 
is a fee appraiser and a real estate broker. He appraised the 
property at ?931 South 8th East, atfer a thorough examination 
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and in accordance with standard appraisal technique (R. 202-
203). The value of the property as of February 1, 1950 was 
$17,200.00 (R. 204). The value as of February 1, 1951 was 
$19,200.00 (R. 227). 
He is a past president of the Utah State Real Estate Asso-
ciation, acquainted with practices and customs of real estate 
men in the area, with much experience in exchanges of prop-
erty. There is no custom in this area which requires a real 
estate salesman working on an exchange of properties, par-
ticularly where one is in an area with which he is not familiar, 
to reduce the properties to dollar values and report that to 
the customer (R. 207-208). 
Wayne Carroll testified that he was unemployed due to 
a heart attack and was formerly a real estate broker under the 
name of Carroll Realty Company, a corporation (R. 249). At 
the time he took the listing from the plaintiff on Exhibit 5, 
he told Smith they could not get $23,000.00 for it and Smith 
said: "We can always try" (R. 252). The closing papers 
between the Smiths and Kladises were prepared under his 
direction and he had several conversations with William Smith 
(R. 252). He was present when Nate Smith reported to 
William Smith the conversation with Mr. Teeples that Teeples 
was not a real estate man and thought $15,500.00 '"as a little 
high, but William Smith said he expected something like that 
and did not seem surprised (R. 253). There was also discussion 
about the fact that if it was a trade that would affect the price 
(R. 254). The call to Mr. Teeples had taken place in the 
Carroll Realty Office and he had heard Nate Smith's end of 
it (R. 254). 
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At the time the transaction was consummated, he gave 
the deed on the Eighth East place to Bill Smith's wife and 
Bill took it from her and said he did not want her looking the 
papers over, just wanted her to sign them (R. 257). In the 
summer of 1951 he went to Lava Hot Springs with William 
F. Smith and examined the property formerly owned by Kladis 
and formed the opinion that its value was $10,000.00 or 
$11,000.00, which he discussed with Mr. Smith while they 
were there and that it was useless to try to get $15,000.00 or 
$16,000.00 out of it (R. 261). Smith said he had a cushion 
there, but it was not enough (R. 262) . 
He was formerly a member of the Salt Lake Multiple List-
ing Bureau and knows of no practice among realtors working 
out exchanges under which estimates or opinions of value are 
given to customers where exchanges are involved (R. 263). 
On cross-examination Mr. Carroll said he was not sure 
his appraised value of the Lava Hot Springs was given to 
Mr. Smith but he did tell him the price of $15,500.00 or 
$16,000.00 could not be realized from it (R. 265). 
The deposition of Morris W. Teeples was published 
(R. 86), in which Morris W. Teeples testified that he lives 
at Lava Hot Springs and is in the dry-cleaning business (p. 2). 
He owns no real estate in Lava Hot Springs and has not 
engaged in real estate transactions there. He is a Bishop of 
the L.D.S. Church and knows generally of the property for-
merly owned by Nick Kladis there. He had been in the Kladis 
home twice prior to December, 1950 and remembers receiving 
a telephone call about this property from Nathaniel Smith 
in December, 1950, or January, 1951 (p. 2-4). Mr. Smith 
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asked him if he was Bishop of the Ward and asked about the 
property and what he figured it would be worth. Smith quoted 
a price of $15,500.00 which he told him sounded high because 
the building was poorly built and had no heating plant "and 
I thought that the price was a little high," but after Smith 
mentioned that it was to be a trade to be made on Utah prop-
erty, he told him that would be different because maybe the 
property in Salt Lake would be high enough to offset that 
(p. 4-6). 
The defendants then rested. 
On rebuttal, William F. Smith testified that before this 
exchange was worked out Nathaniel Smith did suggest a reduc-
tion of the price of the Eighth East home (R. 266). 
On rebuttal, Nathaniel A. Smith testified only as to the 
Murray Store, formerly owned by Smith (R. 268). 
The Jury was instructed and after deliberating for some 
time inquired whether in Group 3 plaintiff was singular or 
plural (R. 279). The Jury came back again with a question 
as to Group 4, Proposition A and B and stated their under-
standing that if Proposition A under Group4 is marked, the 
verdict is returned to the Court and if they marked Propo-
sition B, then they consider the final page. The Court con-
firmed this (R. 280). 
The Jury later returned with the verdict with an X as to 
Group 1, Proposition A; Group 2, Proposition A; Group 3, 
Proposition A; Group 4, Proposition A; and nothing filled 
in on Group 5 (R. 280) . 
The Court stated that the effect of the verdict is for the 
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defendant, no cause of action, "and that the scope of the 
employment of the plaintiff of the defendant Smith was to 
determine and report the reasonable value of the Kladis 
property, that the defendant's Smith breach of that employ-
ment agreement was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's entry 
into the exchange transaction, and that the entry was made 
with full knowledge of all of the parties that the defendant 
Smith had." All the Jury said this was its verdict, except Mr. 
Ownby and he said he understood that it was a stand-off. The 
Court said that was so, the parties would be left as they came 
there. Mr. Ownby stated that was different than they imagined, 
as they thought their verdict entitled the plaintiff to some-
thing. They thought the verdict would make a judgment for 
the plaintiff. The other jurors indicated that they felt the same 
way (R. 282-283). Mr. Ownby said that was really the reason 
that they had come back the time before (R. 283). 
The jury then retired to further deliberate and returned 
with the change in their cross on Group 4, placing it on Propo-
sition B, and with Group 5 filled in for $3,700.00 and $1,150.00, 
with seven signatures on the verdict (R. 284). 
In support of the Motion for New Trial on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence (R. 63) there was the Affidavit 
of H. E. Baird stating that he had looked for all documents 
in the files of Fletcher-Lucas before the trial and that following 
the trial the defendant Smith came and requested a further 
search, whereupon additional papers were found (R. 67), 
which additional papers and documents included a letter to 
Nick Kladis, written by Mr. Baird dated December 8, 1950, 
enclosing a photograph of 3031 South 8th East, and inviting 
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Mr. Kladis to come to Salt Lake and consider an exchange 
(R. 69) ; a letter from Mr. Baird to Mr. Kladis dated De-
cember 16th, reporting that Mr. Smith had agreed to take 
the Lava Hot Springs property and inviting him to come to 
Salt Lake City to complete arrangements (R. 70); copy of an 
exchange agreement dated December 11, 1950 which was a 
copy of Exhibit 4 (R. 71); a document similar to Exhibit 4 
and containing a counter-proposal signed by W. F. Smith 
dated December 11, 1950 (R. 72); and an exchange agree-
ment dated December 18, 1950 and signed by Mr. and Mrs. 
Kladis and both plaintiffs and witnessed by H. E. Baird (R. 73). 
ARGUMENT 
This was a confused case. Although two pretrials were 
held, there is nothing in the pretrial orders which indicate 
what the issues were to be or how the case was to be tried. 
The Second Cause of Action is ambiguous as to whether it 
is ex contractu or ex delicto. The Third Cause of Action was 
added orally after the trial was concluded and was plainly 
an action in breach of contract for recovery of commission 
paid. The Amended Answers raise issues in both contract and 
tort and some of these defenses were added after the case 
had been tried and submitted to the jury. 
The line of demarcation between actions sounding in 
contract and in tort is a dim and indistinct one. 1 Am. Jur. 
on Actions, Sections 50, 51, 55. In this case the Second Cause 
of Action appears plainly to sound in tort, and appellants 
suggest that it was an action in tort for negligent performance 
of a contract. The contract is essential to the cause of action, 
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but the nature of the action 1s tortious performancf of the 
contract. 
The Third Cause of Action is mentioned as a simple 
contract action for return of consideration due to breach of 
contract, although it was never written by the plaintiffs and 
all that exists is the oral statement made by counsel to the 
Court after the Jury had left. "Comes now the plaintiff and 
moves to amend the Complaint, setting forth as an additional 
County the right to receive, as damages, the commission paid 
in this case" (R. 272). 
The Special Verdict submitted to the Jury by the Court, 
although confusing, assumes a theory of negligent performance 
of a contract, as much as anything else, although Group 2 
sounds purely in contract and uses the phrase "breached his 
employment agreement." But Group 3 refers to proximate 
cause of the damage and seems closer to the tort theory of dam-
age than contract. 
As will appear in the development of appellant's argu-
ments, the errors relied upon are more plain if the theory 
of the action is in contract; and we shall, therefore, make the 
unfavorable assumption that the theory of the action sounds 
in tort because this Court could draw that conclusion. 
POINTS RELIED ON 
1. The Written Agreement did not require that defend-
ants determine values of exchange properties. 
2. If there was an oral modification of the Written Agree-
ment, it was void under the Statute of Frauds. 
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3. Negligent performance of a duty based upon a void 
contract is not actionable. 
4. The Court erred in refusing an instruction on con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk. 
5. The signed Exchange Agreement waived the Second 
Cause of Action. 
6. Dismissal of the Count as to Fraud was an abandon-
ment of plaintiffs' only tenable position. 
7. There was a failure of proof as to the plaintiff, Patsy 
Smith. 
8. The Court erred in directing a verdict for the amount 
of the real estate commission on the Eighth East home. 
9. The Court abused its discretion in denying the Motion 
for New Trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
POINT 1. 
THE WRITTEN AGREElviENT DID NOT REQUIRE 
THAT DEFENDANTS DETERMINE VALUES OF EX-
CHANGE PROPERTIES. 
This is important because Nate Smith believed his obli-
gation was as contained in the Written Agreement (R. 115, 231-
232), and because it is the necessary starting point for the 
conversation between the two Smiths on the way back from 
Lava Hot Springs. It must be remembered that the listing 
agreement, Exhibit 5, was taken by Wayne Carroll from the 
plaintiff, William F. Smith, and that there were no other 
parties to that agreement. 
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The Court instructed the jury that employment of a real 
estate broker can be merely to find a person willing to ex-
change, "or he may employ a real estate broker to determine 
the value of property being considered * * * " (R. 38). 
Although this Instruction is true, it surely was an invitation to 
the jury to find that the defendant Smith was obligated to 
determine values, although the written agreement did not 
require that. 
The Court then instructed the Jury that the agreement 
of employment was contained "in the listing agreement and 
any modifications thereof, entered into subsequently by the 
parties either orally or in writing," (R.39), which is a further 
invitation to the Jury to find that the defendants were obli-
gated beyond the listing agreement. And then Instruction No. 
9 was: "If a real estate broker is employed to determine 
the value of a piece of property, he is bound to exercise reason-
able care, skill, and diligence" (R. 40). This again is true 
but it is misleading and is a strong invitation to the Jury to 
find for the plaintiff. Appellants admit that a broker is bound 
to exercse reasonable care, skill, and diligence in his employ-
ment. But the Instruction emphasizes care only in connection 
with determination of value, the requirement of which was a 
controverted issue. Then, Instruction No. 10 refers to the re-
lationship of salesman and client "as one of confidence and 
trust" and requiring "the utmost good faith at all times, and 
to make full and complete disclosure of any and all informa-
tion he had which would materially affect the interest of his 
client" (R. 41). In view of the conflicting evidence which 
was before the Jury, it would be hard for the Jury not to 
find for the plaintiff if it paid any attention to these four In-
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structions. And Instruction No. 10 doesn't refer to value, but 
to any information. 
What then was the written agreement ? 
Exhibit 5 is the standard listing agreement such as was 
before this Court in Reich vs. Christopulous, 123 U. 137, 
256 P. 2d, 238 at 239. In that case and under that listing 
agreement this Court held that the real estate agent "had a 
duty to represent their interest in good faith, to discharge it 
with reasonable skill and diligence, and to disclose to them 
all peritnent facts which would materially affect their interest." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The nature of the relationship is, therefore, established 
by this Court, but that is not to read into the listing agreement 
any obligation to determine values of properties. In Frye v. 
Levanger, 76 Idaho 252, 281 P. 2d 134, the Idaho Court 
observed that requiring reasonable skill and care does not 
impose upon a real estate agent duties or responsibilities 
beyond those expressed or implied by his contract of employ-
ment. And in Coe v. Ware, 40 Minnesota 404, 42 N.W. 205, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a requirement that 
real estate agents determine facts as to value will not be 
inferred in the absence of evidence that it was included in 
the employment. In this record there is silence as to any 
requirement of determination of value in connection with the 
signing of Exhibit 5 by the plaintiff, William F. Smith. 
The plaintiffs attempted to prove that determination of 
value is made as a matter of custom by real estate brokers in 
Utah. Fred F. Jensen, a retired real estate man, responded 
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to leading questions that there is a common practice by which 
realtors determine market values of property (R. 162). This 
witness then proceeded to explain how he appraises property 
and testified that the procedure he had described about exam-
ining properties amounted to an appraisal (R. 166). He did 
not testify that the listing agreement required or contemplated 
determination of value, but only how such determinations are 
made. He was a member of the Multiple Listing Bureau of 
Salt Lake City before the year 1940 (R. 166), which was too 
remote to be effective as to present practices. The witnesses, 
H. E. Baird (R. 192), Wayne Carroll (R. 263), and Francis 
Solomon, ~ormer president of the Utah Association of Real 
Estate Boards (R. 207-208), all testified that in making ex-
changes there was no custom or practice or requirement arising 
from a listing agreement that properties be appraised. 
Indeed, the evidence in this case was devoted in large 
part to the testimony between the two Smiths as they drove 
back from Lava Hot Springs in an effort to determine whether 
there was a special agreement applicable in this case and, 
if so, what was that agreement. It seems plain from the 
instructions, the contract, the evidence, and the positions of 
the parties that there is no showing here that Exhibit 5 
required determination of values before an exchange could be 
made. 
POINT 2. 
IF THERE WAS AN ORAL MODIFICATION OF THE 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT, IT WAS VOID UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
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Group 1 of the Special Verdict included this Proposition 
A: "The scope of the employment agreement required the 
defendant Smith to determine and report the reasonable value 
of the Kladis property." The Jury found this Proposition 
(R. 51). 
An oral modification of a written agreement within the 
Statute of Frauds must also be written to be valid. The trial 
court, in effect, found this to be the law and said: 
"The Court tentatively is of the opinion that such 
is the fact, but is of the opinion that the agent was 
bound by the written agreement of employment to 
disclose to his principal what he had learned concern-
ing the value of the property and that a breach in that 
respect was a breach of the written agreement, and 
on this ground the motions are denied." 
This statement goes off on a tangent. The defendant Smith 
either was or was not required, as a matter of agreement, to 
obtain and report certain information. If there was such an 
agreement, it was void. Appellants were entitled to an instruc-
tion to that effect. Failure to give such an instruction was 
prejudicial for the very reason outlined by the Court (R. 75). 
After building up the scope of the employment to include 
determination of value by Instructions numbered 7, 8, 9, and 
10, and after including the scope of the employment agree-
ment as modified by the oral agreement, in the Special Verdict, 
Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, and Group 4, it is a strange thing 
for the Court to rule, in passing on the Motion for New Trial 
and for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, that the oral 
agreement was meaningless, since the written agreement 
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required disclosure of the information, whether it was within 
the agreement or not. 
If the oral agreement was void because of the Statute of 
Frauds, there should have been no reference to a possible 
oral agreement in any of the Instructions or in any part of 
the Special Verdict, and the Jury should have been instructed 
on the theory that there was a written employment agreement 
which required that important information obtained in the 
course of the transaction be reported to the employer. That 
would have made meaningless all of the testimony and all 
of the argument about whether there was an oral agreement 
requiring the defendant to do something, for breach of which 
damages were to be imposed on the defendant. 
This question is the subject of a series of annotations 
appearing at 17 ALR 10, 29 ALR 1095, 80 ALR 539, and 
118 ALR 1511. In the 80 ALR and 118 ALR annotations 
Utah cases are cited as supporting the doctrine that a contract 
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing cannot be 
modified by subsequent oral agreement. This appears to be 
the general rule. The Utah cases cited are: Combined Metals 
v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 267 P. 1020, 1031-1032, and Bam-
berger Company v. Certified Productions, 88 Utah 194, 48 
P. 2d 489, 491. Appellants admit that if fraud were alleged 
and supported, the Statute of Frauds could not be pleaded as 
an instrument to defraud a person who had relied on the 
oral modification in rendering performance. But that is not 
the situation here. In fact, the agreement relied on by the 
plaintiffs as requiring determination of value, was not so 
much a modification, as an additional agreement imposed upon 
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the real estate broker. There was no new or additional con-
sideration, and the party who rendered the performance or 
the purported performance of the modified agreement was the 
defendant Smith and not the plaintiff. We have, therefore, 
none of the elements of fraud or estoppel to modify the general 
rule of these cases. 
In the Combined Metals case this Court holds that where 
there is no new or independent consideration and there are 
additional duties imposed, the Staute of Frauds requires a 
modifying agreement to be in writing. 
In the Bamberger case the Court recognized the general 
rule "that a contract required by the Statute of Frauds to be 
in writing cannot be modified by subsequent oral agreements." 
The Court goes on to observe that this principle cannot be 
employed to perpetrate an injustice and to offer an asylum 
to a person who has rendered performance in reliance upon 
the modification. But, again, that is not the case here. The 
Jury apparently found that there was a modification of the 
written agreement, but there was obviously no new or addi-
tional consideration. The plaintiffs rendered no performance 
of this modified agreement, the denial of which would work 
a fraud upon him. It is a case where the one who received 
the performance is attempting to allege inadequacy of the 
performance and refuses to be bound by the Statute of Frauds 
m showing the measure of the performance required. If de-
fendant should be accused of leading plaintiffs into a trap 
and using the Statute of Frauds as a cloak, the plaintiffs should 
allege and prove the fraud by clear and satisfactory evidence. 
Different portions of the Statute of Frauds demand differ-
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ent treatment. Contracts not to be performed in a year may 
be taken out of the Statute by part performance, else it would 
be inequitable. But the requirement that employment of a 
broker connected with purchase of real estate must be m 
writing must not be taken out of the Statute of Frauds by 
part performance, or the provision of the Statute would be 
meaningless. Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335. 
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to establish definitely 
and in writing the terms of the employment. To permit 
departure from this requirement, except to avoid fraud, would 
defeat the purpose of this Statute. See Knight v. Chamberlain, 
6 Utah 2d 394, at 399, 315 P. 2d 273; also Williston on Con-
tracts, Revised Edition, Section 593. 
POINT 3. 
NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY BASED 
UPON A VOID CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE. 
The Court assumed that negligence in performing a con-
tract need not be concerned with the Statute of Frauds and 
so the Instructions on negligence were made without reference 
to whether the agreement as to making inquiry or determining 
value was in writing. 
In A. A. Easton v. Milton S. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 
391-392, 295 P. 2d 332, this Court seems to have passed on 
that question: 
"If an action sounding in tort were allowed in every 
instance where the contract was unenforceable because 
not in writing, and barred by the Statute of Frauds, 
the Statute would be rendered meaningless. As stated 
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• 
in 3 7 CJS, Frauds, Statute of, Section 224: ' * * * The 
operation of the Statute is not confined to cases where 
an action is brought directly on the contract. What-
ever the form of the action may be, if the proof of 
promise or contract within the Statute is essential to 
maintain it, there can be no recovery unless the Statute 
is satisfied * * * . Even an action sounding in tort may 
be barred by the Statute, where an essential element 
of the cause of action is an oral contract within the 
Statute; but where the oral contract or representation 
is a mere circumstance or incident of a fraud, it may 
be shown in an action in tort for damages, as the 
Statute has no application to such a case.' " 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AN INSTRUC-
TION ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK. 
Appellants raised the defense of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk in the Amended Answer (R. 13-14), 
which was filed six weeks before the trial. Plaintiffs also 
requested instruction to the Jury on the issue of contributory 
negligence (R. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30). 
The Court treated the evidence as though defendant' 
Smith had learned from Morris Teeples that the Lava Hot 
Springs property was grossly overvalued for the purpose of 
the exchange. Had such been the fact, the failure to disclose 
it would have been a fraud upon the plaintiff and the cause 
of action for fraud could safely have been left in the case. 
Plaintiffs dismissed the First Cause of Action because it was 
obvious that Nate Smith had not deal fraudulentlr and that 
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if there had been any shortcoming at all, it would have to 
be classed as negligence or an oversight. 
We know that Nate Smith learned from Morris Teeples 
from four sources: Mr. Teeples' deposition, Nate Smith's 
recital of the conversation, Wayne Carroll's recital of one 
end of the telephone conversation and the relating of the 
conversation by Nate Smith to William Smith, and William 
Smith's recollection of what Nate Smith told him. 
Morris W. Teeples testified in his deposition that he 
was a dry cleaner and as to the property owned by Nick 
Kladis he knew nothing but the location and had been in it 
twice before the telephone call, for a few minutes each time 
(R. 86 page 3) . Teeples did not know what the property was 
worth "and then when he quoted the price, $15,500.00, I told 
him it sounded high to me and when its inclusion in a trade 
was mentioned I told him that would be different because 
maybe the property here would be high enough to offset 
that" (R. 86, p. 5). Nate Smith testified that he told the 
plaintiff "that Mr. Teeples said he was not a real estate man, 
but he was familiar with property in Lava, he was in business 
there, and he thought that that property was a little high 
at $15,500.00, but that on a trade for Salt Lake property that 
would be another thing, as it might be a fair exchange" (R. 
233). The discrepancies between the Teeples statement and 
the Smith recital of it seems to be to make Teeples familiar 
with property in Lava and insertion of the word "little" in 
referring to the price of $15,500.00 as being high. 
Wayne Carroll testified that Nate Smith told William 
Smith that Teeples was not a real estate man and thought 
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$15,500.00 was a little high, but William Smith said he 
expected something like that and did not seem surprised (R. 
253). 
William Smith testified that Nate Smith told him: "I 
asked him what he had found out about the property in Idaho 
and he said: 'Yes, from all I can determine, it looks like a 
good deal to me.' He said he had contacted a reliable source" 
(R. 108). Again, Nate is described as saying: 'The L.D.S. 
Bishop had been contacted and Smith 'felt that that might be 
a fair price on that property and was satisfied that that would 
be a fair price.' '' 
There is no evidence that defendant Smith ever told 
William Smith that Teeples was a real estate man or knew 
values or gave him any misstatement as to what Teeples had 
told him. Nate Smith gave his opinoin to the plaintiff, included 
in which was his conversation with Teeples. If that was mis-
representation, it was fraudulent. If Nate Smith was negligent 
in making that statement, then William Smith was negligent 
in relying on it, since there was no indication that Teeples' 
opinion was probative or that Nate Smith's opinion was 
corroborated by substantial facts. Plaintiff had inspected the 
property and had made a counter-proposal before the Teeples 
conversation was related to him, according to Nate Smith's 
testimony (R. 224, 239) and according to the documents 
included in the Motion For New Trial (R. 72). Plaintiff 
was negligent if he accepted Smith's recommendation as an 
opinion that the Lava Hot Springs property was worth $15,-
500.00 cash. 
In Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P. 2d 623, this 
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Court quoted from Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d 
865, as follows: 
"No matter how naive or inexperienced the de-
fendants were, they could not close their eyes and 
accept unquestioningly any representations made to 
them. It was their duty to make such investigation and 
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances 
would dictate; whether this required them to make 
further inquiry concerning the income, and if so, the 
extent thereof was for the jury to determine.'' 
The law is plain that contributory negligence or contributory 
fault of a principal can defeat his action against an agent or 
broker, and the facts in this case were such that defendants 
were entitled to have the Jury know this principle of law. 
Section 415 of the Restatement of Agency thus states 
the principle: 
"The liability of the agent to the principal may be 
avoided, terminated, or reduced, by a breach of contract 
by the principal, his contributory fault, or his failure 
to mitgate damages." 
The illustrations given are where a principal knows a fire 
insurance policy has not been cancelled, as requested, or 
knows that the agent has not paid money over, as required. 
The same principle is announced in Section 162 of 3 CJS on 
Agency. The discussion in 23 Am. Jur., page 948, 960-961, 
makes the rule plain. This is in the title on fraud and indicates 
that contributory negligence is plainly available as a defense 
in actions involving representation of facts, except where there 
is fraud and here there is a division of authority because of 
a conflict in interest to punish those who use fraudulent means 
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to accomplish their ends and to require of a person seeking 
assistance that he will have used due care; but unless fraud 
is charged, the defense of contributory negligence accords with 
the policy of the law. See also Salem vs. DeWitt-Jenkins Realty 
Co. (Ohio App.), 113 N.E. 2d 918, where the plaintiff gave 
the agent a faulty description and then failed to check on 
whether the agent had verified the description; Moore v. 
Coler, 99 N.Y.S. 846, 114 App. Div. 301, where plaintiff relied 
on representations concerning bonds about which he had 
means of knowledge; Benton v. Roberts (Ga. App.), 134 
S.E. 846, where the principal could have avoided loss through 
ordinary care in determining whether loans of money were 
secured; Fort Valley Coca Coca Co. vs. Lumbermen's Mutual 
Insunrance Co., 69 Ga. App. 120, 24 S.E. 2d 846, 851, where 
it was held the plaintiff should have examined his policy of 
insurance and not relied on the agent's statement as to what 
it contained; Lawrason v. Richard, 135 So. 29, 172 La. 696; 
and Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075, both 
involving automobile accidents; Schneider vs. Suhrman (No. 
8716 ____ Utah ____ , ____ P. 2d ____ ,where supplier should have 
known that retailer might not cook pork products. 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P. 2d 134 at 137, 
contains a discussion similar to that from 23 Am. Jur. (supra). 
This Court there observed that contributory negligence will 
seldom be allowed as a plea to a wilfull wrong, indicating 
that against the plea of negligence in making statements of 
fact, contributory negligence such as failure to read a docu-
ment will defeat recovery unless fraud is involved. And 
although it is not a square holding involving a plea of con-
tributory negligence, this Court applied the principle of con· 
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' tributary fault in Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 267, 367, 
300 P. 2d 623, where the court considered cancellation of the 
contract for misrepresentation or misapprehension as to fact 
and in refusing cancellation to the defendant observed: 
"He spent no time obtaining independent advice 
as to the value of the farm and, even though he was 
told by the seller that there was a water loss between 
the source of the creek and the ranch, he did not 
investigate how much loss occurred or the cost of 
preventing the loss. Under these circumstances, the 
trial court made the finding that there was no fraud 
involved * * * ." 
Clay v. Dunford, supra, explains the difference between 
contributory negligence and the assumption of risk existing 
where there is a known danger to which one voluntarily sub-
jects himself. 
In a brief annotation at 62 ALR 1357, 1360, entitled 
"Skill and Care Required of Real Estate Broker," the rule is 
also stated that in the absence of special circumstances "the 
principal has been held to be barred from recovering for the 
agent's negligence by contributory negligence." 
The issue of contributory negligence was plainly raised, 
instructions were requested, and it surely is negligent to rely 
on any off-hand opinion of an L.D.S. Bishop as to whether 
a proposed exchange should be made, where there is no evi-
dence that the L.D.S. Bishop knows anything about the one 
property, and cannot possibly know anything about the other 
property. Under the instructions given, the jury was permitted 
to penalize the defendant as to all of plaintiff's theoretical 
damage, if it could find that any statement made by the L.D.S. 
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Bishop was not accurately and completely related to the 
plaintiffs, regardless of whether Nate Smith believed the 
opinion of the L.D.S. Bishop to be significant, and regardless 
of the right of the plaintiffs to let such a person and such a 
conversation be a substitute for determination of value. And all 
of this is in the atmosphere of exchange of properties far re-
moved from each other, where the real question is not so much 
the value of a particular piece of property, but comparative 
values, coupled with the fact that the owner of the Lava property 
owned his outright and was willing to assume a mortgage 
on the other property, and was also willing to loan cash to the 
plaintiffs, which happened to be a much needed item. 
All of this was known to the parties. Plaintiff saw ·the 
property and knew no appraisal was made. He did not inquire 
as to the competency of the L.D.S. Bishop or the source of 
Nate Smith's inquiry. He preferred to go ahead and assumed 
the risk of proceeding blindly. He was guilty of contributory 
neligence and this proposition should have been given to the 
Jury. (See Cole v. Parker, supra, at p. 268). 
POINT 5. 
THE SIGNED EXCHANGE AGREEMENT WAIVED 
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The particular clause of the contract (Exhibit 1), relied 
upon by the Appellant, reads: 
"It is also presumed and understood that all prin-
cipals to this agreement have investigated the respective 
properties, and the agent or broker is hereby released 
from all responsibility regarding valuation of same.'' 
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The trial judge ruled in Point II of his Partial Decision 
on Motions that the defendants' failure to disclose an opinion 
as to the value of the property presented an action on which 
a claim could not be waived by contract (R. 75). The failure 
to disclose an opinion sounds like fraud, but of course there 
were no instructions on fraud and the First Cause of Action 
was dismissed. The Court, therefore, must have had in mind 
that a waiver of negligence or a cause of action for negli-
gence is contrary to public policy. This is the subject of an 
annotation at 175 ALR 8 and where applied to future negli-
gence, the rule is admitted to have some force. This Court 
has recognized such a rule in Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., 
117 Utah 171, 213 P. 2d 667; Jankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 
325, 54 P. 2d 425; Brooks v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
26 Utah 147, 72 P. 499. But we are not here concerned either 
with fraud or with anticipated negligence. The question here 
is whether an existing cause of action, based upon negligence 
or breach of a contract, can be waived by the execution of a 
contract containing the waiver. Such a contract will be upheld 
in the absence of fraud. Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 
432, 19 P. 2d 389; Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. vs. 
Kay, 81 Ctah 595, 21 P. 2d 836, B. T. Moran, Inc. vs. First 
S:ecurity Corporation, 82 Utah 316, 24 P. 2d 384 (see 10 
ALR 1432). Those cases involved sales of personal property 
wherein clauses in the contracts stated that the contracts were 
complete, and warranties or oral representations and actions 
thereon were waived by the parties. This seems to be the 
principle involved in the execution of Exhibit 1. The docu-
ment containing the waiver was signed by the plaintiffs on 
January 5th, after any claim of reporting the Teeples con-
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versation. Whether the signed agreement filed with the Motion 
for New Trial (R. 73) was signed after a report of the Teeples 
conversation, would have to be determined in a new trial. 
This principle, in the absence of fraud, is well established. 
See 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 182. 
POINT 6. 
DISMISSAL OF THE COUNT AS TO FRAUD WAS 
AN ABANDONMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S ONLY TEN-
ABLE POSITION. 
The action was tried on the theory that the plaintiffs were 
attempting to prove fraud, both as a means of getting around 
the Statute of Frauds and as a means of setting aside the 
exchange agreement with its waiver of conduct of the broker. 
Defendants also had pleaded laches in bringing the action. 
This matter had been discussed at pretrial and the instructions 
of the Jury with fraud in issue would have had to involve 
a different burden of proof from that for negligence or breach 
of contract. It was plain from the Court's instructions to the 
Jury that fraud was not an element in the plaintiffs' case. 
Defendants have taken the position by their pleadings 
and at the pretrial and at the trial that unless fraud can be 
proved, plaintiffs cannot make out a cause of action. If this 
Court comes to the same conclusions, upon consideration of 
the foregoing points and arguments, the plaintiffs will not have 
lost their case, but will have opportunity to retry the case 
on the theory of fraud and perhaps upon the theory of negli-
gence with appropriate provision for contributory negligence, 
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if the Statute of Frauds can be satisfied and if plaintiffs did 
not waive their cause of action against the broker. 
POINT 7. 
THERE WAS A FAILURE OF PROOF AS TO THE 
PLAINTIFF, PATSY SMITH. 
The plaintiff Patsy Smith did not testify and entered 
not at all into the preliminary transactions, except to be 
prsent when the transaction was consummated (R. 141 and 
257) and to sign Exhibit 1. She was, however, mentioned 
as one of the owners of the property on Eighth East (R. 123, 
124, 125). The Jury noted that in Group 3, Proposition A, 
the word "plantiiff" was singular and in Proposition B it was 
plural (R. 53). The Jury was instructed that in both cases the 
word was plural. 
It is plain that Patsy Smith was not a party to the listing 
agreement (R. 250) and was not a party to the conversation 
on the return trip from Lava Hot Springs. She simply went 
along with her husband, who stated that she was not supposed 
to have an opinion on the sufficiency of the transaction, but 
was only supposed to sign (R. 257). Did this establish a 
cause of action in favor of Patsy Smith? 
Patsy Smith did not sign Exhibit 1, which was the ex-
change agreement, and at the time it was signed the two Smith 
men went to another room where they discussed, among 
other things, the two properties (R. 149). Wayne Carroll 
took the listing agreement from W. F. Smith, with no mention 
of Mrs. Smith (R. 250, 251, 264). William F. Smith stated 
that he listed the property (R. 128, R. 99, 100). 
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The failure to establish any evidence in favor of Patsy 
Smith was one of the bases for the Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding Verdict (R. 61). In denying the Motion on 
this ground, the Court stated that it was of the opinion that 
Patsy Smith joined in the listing agreement, and so the Motion 
was denied (R. 76-77). The error of the Court in making 
this assumptoin suggests that if the Court had had the facts 
and the transcripts available and in mind, the Motion would 
have been granted on this ground. 
Mrs. Patsy Smith was a co-owner of the Eighth East 
property. Title was taken in the name of husband and wife 
(R. 123, 124, 125) and it can only be presumed that the 
interests of husband and wife were equal, 48 CJS 930, 932. 
The general rule is that a tort committed upon one person 
furnishes no cause of action in favor of another. 39 Am. Jur., 
Parties, Section 10; 38 Am. Jur., Title Negligence, Section 21 
at page 662; Central Georgia Power Co. v. Pope, 141 Ga. 186, 
80 S.E. 642, LRA 1916 (d), 358. This general rule is recog-
nized in cases where third persons claim damage from negli-
gent work of independent contractors. Berg v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832; Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 
Utah 85, 249 P. 437. The only basis for liability in that type 
of case is where the contractor knew that there was imminent 
danger and also knew that persons such as plaintiff would 
use the dangerous instrumentality. In the instant case there 
was no evidence what~ver that Mrs. Patsy Smith even knew 
of the conversation between the two Smiths on the way back 
from Lava Hot Springs or that she even knew that the property 
had been listed with Carroll Realty Company. There was no 
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testimony of any kind that she relied on any statements made 
by Nate Smith or that her husband ever advised her that Nate 
Smith had informed him that the difference between the 
properties at fair value was represented by the mortgage on the 
Eighth East property. 
Had there been a claim of fraudulent representation by 
Nate Smith, the law will permit a damaged third party to re-
cover for the fraudulent representation. 8 Am. Jur., Title 
Brokers, Section 135, page 1062. 
POINT 8. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT 
FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE REAL ESTATE COMMIS-
SION ON THE EIGHTH EAST HOME. 
The Court withdrew this question from the Jury and, 
in effect, included it as additional damages to the plaintiff, in 
the event the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiffs on 
other grounds (R. 43 and 55). The Court considered this 
to be a real estate commission paid to the defendants and 
characterized it as a refund (R. 55). The evidence was specific 
that this $1,150.00 was paid to Fletcher-Lucas Company and 
not Carroll Realty Company (R. 238). This Third Cause of 
Action was inserted after the trial upon oral motion (R. 272), 
and appellants promptly denied that they had received the 
commission (R. 273). And appellants took exception to the 
giving of Group No. 5 for the reason that the $1,150.00 had 
not been received by the Appellants (R. 277), and took ex-
ception to the giving of Instruction No. 12 for the same 
reason (R. 278). 
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If the exchange had been found proper and involving 
no breach of contract, the plaintiffs would have been out 
of pocket the $1,150.00. The Court instructed the Jury that 
the damage of the plaintiffs, if they were allowed to recover 
anything, was the difference between the value of the two 
houses, reduced by the assumed $7,500.00 mortgage. This was 
all of the damages of the plaintiffs and would have made 
plaintffs whole. Adding the $1,150.00 amounted to additional 
damage or double damage and made the plaintiffs better off 
by reason of the breach. The loss on overestimating the valu-
ation was found at $3,700.00 (R. 55 and 59). Instruction No. 
12 advised the Jury that there were two items of damages. 
The first was for $1,150.00, and the second one was to be 
derived by determining market value of the equity of plaintiff 
in the Eighth East home and subtracting the fair market value 
of the Kladis property from that. The remainder, if any, 
would be the amount of damages plaintiffs suffered. This 
latter measure of damages was all plaintiffs were entitled to. 
"A person injured by the commission of a tort is 
entitled to actual pecuniary compensation for the 
injury sustained, and except where the circumstances 
are such as to warrant the allowance of exemplary 
damages, he is limited to such compensation. He is not 
to be placed in a better position than he would have 
been in had the wrong not been done." 15 Am. Jur. 
on Damages, 470. 
In Briece v. Bosso (Mo. App.), 158 S.W. 2d 463, the Court 
held that where an exchange of real estate is based upon 
misrepresentation of market values and damages are awarded 
to the deceived person, the measure of damages is the difference 
between the market value and the value as represented. That 
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is the measure of damages contained in Instruction No. 12, 
without the commission of $1,150.00 which would place the 
plaintiffs in a better position than if there had been no repre-
sentation. 
In Isaacs v. Frank Meline Co. (Cal. App. hearing denied 
by Supreme Court) 37 P. 2d 1045, 1047-1048, the California 
Court seems to have passed upon this precise question. In 
that case there had been an exchange of land for a worthless 
note and trust deed, the value of which had been misrepre-
sented. The value of the land was found to be $13,500.00 and 
judgment was given for that amount and also for the amount 
of commission paid in the sum of $1,119.00, for $90.00 escrow 
fee, and $10.00 for title search. The Court upheld the con-
tention of the appellant that these were not proper items of 
damages, which should have been measured by the value 
of what she gave for the worthless note and trust deed. 
"The value of her equity in the property she traded 
was, according to her own testimony, $13,500.00. Had 
she received this amount with the interest on the 
Spears' note, she would have had no cause of action 
for the commission and other items she paid. Having 
been made whole, as it were, on her deal by the judg-
ment for the value of her equity, and interest thereon, 
this would seem to be the full amount of the detriment 
suffered by her, because the Spears' note and trust deed 
was not what Roberts represented it to be." 
POINT 9. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENY-
ING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
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In the trial of the case there were three real contro-
versies: 
1. Was there an agreement between the Smiths that Nate 
Smith would obtain information from Lava Hot Springs, as to 
the value of property? 
2. In reporting this information to the planitiff Smith, 
was there a negligent representation, a fraudulent representa-
tion, or a reasonable representation? And, 
3. What was the value of the respective properties? 
The plainti.J.-'f contended that he relied implicitly on Nate 
Smith to obtain some information about the value of the 
property and report it to him and that he made no counter 
offer until he had received the report from Nate Smith (R. 
108, 115, 116,a nd 15 0) . Nate Smith, on the other hand, 
testified that on the evening of their return from Lava Hot 
Springs a counter proposal was signed by the plaintiff and 
submitted to Kladis through Fletcher-Lucas Investment Co. 
(R. 215-216) and that when the conversation about Teeples 
was later reported to him, William Smith stated that he was 
not expecting anything different and had a cushion in his 
Eighth East property, anyway (R. 262 and 241). 
The Court specifically instructed the Jury that the matter 
of reliance was a necessary element in establishing the plain-
tiffs' case (R. 53-55). In addition to this, the jury was con-
fronted with the problem of deciding whom it should believe, 
the plaintiff who said he relied on Nate Smith and made no 
counter offer, or the defendant Smith, who said the counter 
offer was made, but that he could not find the copy of it, and 
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that plaintiff did not rely on any statement from him or from 
Bishop Teeples. The Jury obviously believed the plaintiff and 
believed that Nate Smith and Wayne Carroll and H. E. Baird 
(R. 190) were not being truthful. 
The plaintiff testified that the trip to Lava Hot Springs 
was on December 8th or 9th and Nate Smith believed it was 
after December 11th (R. 102, 133, and 216). The plaintiff 
believed the trip to Lava was made before there was a written 
offer from Kladis (R. 133) and Nate Smith testified that 
the trip to Lava was made after the date of the first offer, 
Exhibits 1 and 4, and that an offer from Kladis was discussed 
with William Smith and made the basis of a counter offer 
that very night (R. 215-216, 239). 
Exhibit 3 was the listing of the Eighth East property 
dated June 30, 1950, by W. F. Smith. 
Exhibit 5 was the listing of the Lava property by Nick 
Kladis dated December 11, 1950. 
Exhibit 4 was an exchange agreement signed by Nick 
Kladis, dated December 11, 1950 offering to exchange the 
properties at $23,000.00 and $18,000.00 with a balance of 
$5,500.00. 
Exhibit 1 was an exchange agreement offer signed by 
Nick Kladis, dated December 18, 1950, and offering the ex-
change at $23,000.00 for Eighth East and $15,500.00 for Lava 
Hot Springs, subject to a mortgage for the difference. On the 
acceptance, the date of December 18, 1950, was crossed out 
and January 5, 1951 written in with a signature of W. F. Smith 
witnessed by N. A. Smith and made subject to getting a 
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$3,000.00 loan on Lava Hot Springs place. This is not signed 
by Mrs. Kladis or by Mrs. Smith and there is no acceptance 
of the counter proposal by Nick Kladis. 
Exihbit 2 consisted of the warranty deed from Kladis to 
Smith, the warranty deed from Smith to Kladis, and the mort-
gage from Smith to Kladis, all dated February 1, 1951 and 
representing the consummation of the transaction. 
After the trial, according to the affidavits of Nathaniel 
Smith and H. E. Baird, (R. 65 and 67), Nate Smith insisted 
on a further search for documents which he believed had 
been written concerning this transaction, which resulted in 
the finding of an old file, away from the other file, in which 
additional documents were found and copies presented to 
the Court. 
These documents consist of: copy of letter of H. E. 
Baird to Mr. Kladis, dated December 8, 1950 and enclosing 
a photograph of the Eighth East property, listed at $23,000.00, 
with a proposal to consider trading at $18,000.00 or a differ-
ence of $5,000.00, and inviting Kladis to come to Salt Lake 
(R. 69); 
Offer from Kladis on exchange agreement form dated 
December 11, 1950 and being identical with Exhibit 4; 
Additional copy of same exchange agreement offer dated 
December 11, 1950, upon which the price of the Lava property 
has been erased and reduced to $15,500.00, the amount of 
the mortgage has been increased from $5,000.00 to $7,500.00, 
and W. F. Smith has signed the acceptance with the notation, 
"accepted, subject to terms on reverse side" and on the reverse 
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side has been written, "Mr. Kladis to assume present mortgage 
on 3031 South Eighth East, Salt Lake City, and made Mr. 
Smith a loan of $10,000.00, secured by a first mortgage on 
the property in Hot Springs"; 
An exchange agreement on the same form as Exhibit 
1 and appearing to be a carbon copy of Exhibit 1 as it was 
originally written, dated December 18, 1950 and signed by 
Mr. and Mrs. Kladis and by Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and con-
taining no provision as to a $3,000.00 loan on the Lava Hot 
Springs place. 
In the testimony at the trial there was no reference by any 
of the parties to a proposed $10,000.00 loan, as contained 
on the counter offer of Smith dated December 11, 1950, and 
there was no testimony by any party or person as to a signed 
exchange agreement without an advance of cash by the 
Kladisses, as appears from the document presented on the 
Motion for New Trial. 
This newly discovered evidence would be bound to com-
pel far different testimony from the plaintiff upon a new trial, 
as to dates and the making of a counter offer and the reliance 
upon representations of value and would also indicate that 
the parties were bound by an agreement dated December 18, 
1950, and that, thereafter, further negotiations took place 
between the parties and that Kladis finally waived his position 
under the agreement (R. 223-224) and acceded to the need of 
the plaintiff for a loan of money, as shown on Exhibit 1 and as 
finally consummated as shown on Exhibit 2. This tends to show 
awareness by the plaintiff that the Lava Hot Springs property 
was overvalued somewhat and that is why he insisted on the 
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loan of $3,000.00 which Kladis finally made, and that the 
plaintiff relied on no one but himself in entering into the 
exchange agreement. 
Furthermore, the letter from H. E. Baird dated December 
8, 1950 confirms the time table as testified by Nate Smith, 
since on December 8 or 9 Kladis had not yet been advised 
of the Smith property and it was of necessity December 15 
or 16 that the two Smiths went to Lava Hot Springs. This 
means that the exchange agreement dated December 11, 1950 
was in their possession, as testified to by Nate Smith, that the 
counter offer was made immediately upon their return, and 
that on December 18 a new agreement was written up and 
signed by all of the parties, the 18th being the Monday fol-
lowing the trip to Lava Hot Springs on Friday, the 15th. It, 
therefore, appears that the plaintiff's counter proposal was 
acted on almost immediately and that all of the parties gathered 
on Monay and signed up the agreement, making plain the 
anxiety of the plaintiffs to get the exchange completed and 
their satisfaction with the comparative values. 
As far as defendant Smith is concerned, the new docu-
ments compel a change of his testimony as to the amount of 
loan discussed on the way back from Lava Hot Springs to 
make it $10,000.00 instead of $5,000.00 and would compel 
him to recall the agreement signed by all the parties dated 
December 18, 1950 and would further support his testimony 
that the plaintiff did not rely upon any recital of value trans-
mitted from Bishop Teeples. The evidence corroborates de-
fendant almost completely and would compel radical changes 
in plaintiff's testimony. 
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The trial court apparently found that the newly discovered 
evidence satisfied the requirements of Rule 59 as to diligence 
and materiality and which he summarized by saying the new 
evidence indicated "that the plaintiffs had decided to make the 
exchange without waiting for the opinion of any Idaho resi-
dent," which he speculated might still have permitted the 
case to go to the Jury on the theory that the exchange would 
have been abandoned or breached had the opinion of Bishop 
Teeples been transmitted and the Court was of the opinion 
"that the plaintiffs would be very much weaker, and is of the 
opinion that the plaintiffs testified they did not sign any docu-
ments on the evening of the return from Lava Hot Springs" 
(see R. 148) . The Court then indicated that this might justify 
the granting of a new trial but understood there would be 
further investigation of the documents and further argument 
upon the point (R. 76). 
On April 22nd, 1958, the Court finally denied the Motion 
for New Trial and the Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict 
(R. 78) formalized by the Order of May 2, 1958 (R. 79). 
Appellants recognize the rule in this state to be that the 
trial court has a wide latitude of discretion in granting or 
denying motions for new trial. Beck v. Dutchman Coalition 
Mines, 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P. 2d 867; Lindsey v. Eccles Hotel 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P. 2d 477; Bowden v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 266 P. 2d 240; Trimble 
v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674. However, 
where required by the showing made or by error in law, this 
Court has many times reversed trial judges in their rulings 
on Motions for new trial: Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 
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380, 75 P. 2d 705 at 723 (where newly discovered evidence 
was sufficient); Uptown Appliance and Radio Company v. 
Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P. 2d 826 (newly discovered evidence 
insufficient to warrant new trial); Stamp v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 5 Utah 2d 397, 303 P. 2d 279 (excessive verdict arrived 
at as result of passion or prejudice); Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 
Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123 (same); Bowden v. D. & R. G. W. 
R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 266 P. 2d 240 (court's view of the 
law was in error); Haywood v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 6 Utah 
2d 155, 307 P. 2d 1045 (law not adequately presented in 
instructions); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176 
(granting a new trial for inadequacy of verdict was error). 
In Bowden v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., (supra), at page 
450 of 3 Utah 2d, this Court thus stated the rule on reversing 
the District Court in its judgment on new trials: 
"Only when there is error both substantial and preju-
dicial, and when there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the result would have been different without it, should 
error be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or 
grant a new trial." 
The Court cited Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
procedure as noting that a new trial should not be granted 
"unless refusal to take such action appears to the Court incon-
sistent with substantial justice." 
In Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. vs. Flint, Supra, this 
Court, in reversing the granting of a new trial, indicated the 
rule should be followed in determining whether a new trial 
should be granted and said: 
·'There should be none where no showing is made 
of any newly discovered evidence or any other matter 
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to indicate that any different evidence would be pro-
duced such as could be thought to render a different 
result from the one the Jury came to * * * ." 
Likewise, in Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P. 2d 
264, the Court said: 
"A wide discretion is reposed in the trial court in 
granting or denying a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence. The primary concern of the court 
is that justice be done, and the granting of such a 
motion is only reviewable in this court on the question 
of abuse of discretion. Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 
53 P. 2d 115 5. True, the exercise of judical discretion 
in such instance must be based on a showing of sub-
stantial material evidence from which it appears there 
is at least a reasonable likelihood that it would affect 
the result in a new trial." (P. 124). 
In Jensen v. Logan City, Supra, this Court found the 
newly discovered evidence to require reversal of the refusal 
to grant a new trial and in doing so said: 
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital points 
in a case is very scant, newly discovered testimony on 
that point appearing from affidavit in support of the 
motion for a new trial to be apparently reliable, when 
it appears that the movant for the new trial was not 
guilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness 
for the trial, and that there is no element of holding 
such witness in reserve for purposes of obtaining a 
new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in 
slang phraseology as-'an ace in the hole'- and it 
appears likely that such evidence would change the 
result, a new trial should be granted. While the grant-
ing or refusing of the motion lies in the sound dis-
cretion of the court, where there is grave suspicion 
that justice may have miscarried because of the lack 
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of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence 
will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant 
on obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of 
sound discretion not to grant the same." (P. 380). 
It is submitted that the most reliable evidence obtainable 
on this type of case and in view of the controversy between 
the parties, would have been the documents prepared by the 
brokers and signed by parties to the transaction. The trial 
judge recognized that these documents would be important 
to the jury; and consideration of the documents in the light 
of the testimony of the witnesses makes plain the fact that 
the oral testimony would necessarily have been vastly different 
had these documents been available for cross examination 
and much more favorable to the position of the defendant. 
A reading of Instructions 7, 8, 9, and 10 and of the 
Special Verdict will indicate undue concern for the plaintiffs 
with little or no attention paid to the position and the defenses 
of the defendants. It was in this atmosphere that the defendants 
were compelled to present their Motion for New Trial and 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict. It is sub-
mitted that the newly discovered evidence meets the require-
ments of this Court that "it appears likely that such evidence 
would change the result." In the language of an old case: 
"A new trial should not be granted upon the ground 
of newly discovered evidence unless such evidence is 
very clear and satisfactory, and likely to seriously affect 
the result, if admitted." Baumgarten v. Hoffman, 9 
Utah 338, 34 P. 294. 
The newly discovered evidence would show that Mr. 
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Baird wrote to Kladis on December 8, 1950 advising him of 
a possible trade for the Eighth East home, that Kladis came 
to Salt Lake and executed an exchange offer on December 
11th, which was taken to Lava Hot Springs by the two Smiths 
on Friday, December 15th and that on that very evening 
another copy of the December 11th exchange agreement was 
used by plaintiff for the purpose of making a counter pro-
posal. Plaintiff, therefore, did not wait for any word from 
Bishop Teeples or anyone else but made his counter proposal 
because he had seen the property, liked it, and was anxious 
to make the exchange. On the following Monday, December 
18, 1950 the Kladises came to Salt Lake City and an exchange 
agreement was executed by all four of the interested parties, 
after Nate Smith had reported to William Smith his con-
versation with Bishop Teeples of Lava Hot Springs. Or, it 
might have been that shortly after the December 18th agree-
ment was signed, Nate Smith reported the conversation to 
\~Tilliam Smith; but in any event, the plaintiff thereafter started 
to drag his feet and on January 5th signed the exchange 
agreement, Exhibit 1, which eventually became the contract 
between the parties. This amounted to the loan of $3,000.00 
by Kladis and was evidence that plaintiff had good information 
on the values of the properties and was insisting on a further 
concession by Kladis. With this additional evidence it is not 
possible for William Smith to testify that he did not make 
<L counter proposal on the return from Lava Hot Springs or 
that he waited for word from Lava Hot Springs via Nate 
Smith before he went forward. The substantial changes 
which the new evidence would necessitate in the testimony 
cf Willaim Smith would seriously discredit his entire testi-
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mony. On the other hand, the position of Nate Smith, that 
he was making the inquiry as an accommodation to the plaintiff 
and that William Smith did not rely on the report, would be 
entirely vindicated (R. 115). 
This is the case where the newly discovered evidence is 
material, goes to substantial points, would make a vast differ-
ence in the testimony at a new trial, and would in all proba-
bility change the result, as the jury was in doubt anyway (R. 
283). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This was a difficult case because plaintiffs abandoned the 
only logical action for relief, namely, fraudulent representa-
tions by Nate Smith, if in fact there were any misrepresentations 
and if in fact the plaintiff relied on them. The trial judge 
gave comfort to the plaintiffs in this change of theories and 
attempted to instruct the Jury without any reference to fraud 
and upon a theory which appeared to be a mixture of breach 
of contract and negligent performance of a contract. 
The waiver contained in the exchange agreement should 
bar plaintiffs from any action except for fraud to avoid the 
agreement. Likewise, if Nate Smith misrepresented his con-
versation with Bishop Teeples and this was done intentionally, 
it could properly be reached by an action in deceit for mis-
representation. If Nate Smith acted honestly but negligently, 
then he was entitled to have the theory of contributory negli-
gence presented to the Jury, for the reason that if a buyer of 
land asks for the opinion of someone who is not known to 
be familiar with land values, and if he shows no interest in 
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the value of the opinion referred, he would be guilty of con-
tributory negligence. 
The oral agreement testified to by William Smith modified 
the written employment of the broker and under the Statute 
of Frauds must be in writing to be valid and to be the basis 
of this action. 
And, in any event, and if appellants are wrong on the 
foregoing questions of law, it appears plain that there was a 
failure of proof as to the plaintiff Patsy Smith and a further 
error in directing a verdict for $1, 150.00. 
The newly discovered evidence produced from the files 
of Fletcher-Lucas Co. fits into the crucial questions of evidence 
at the trial and virtually disproves the claims of the plaintiffs, 
which tend to show that the plaintiff did not rely on state-
ments of Nate Smith as to the opinions of residents in Lava 
Hot Springs, but went ahead on his own judgment and that 
the Kladises and the Smiths signed an agreement three days 
after the trip to Lava Hot Springs. This evidence would 
completely transform the nature and course of the trial and 
requires that the Court reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and order a new trial of this action with such decision 
as to other questions raised herein as the Court believes might 
be important in a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for Defendants 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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